Safety is more than the absence of accidents. Recent research on ‘Safety 2.0’ and Resilience Engineering has attempted to identify the positive characteristics of safety, and the role of the operator in ‘making safety’. CyClaDes Task 2.5 examined the topic to identify practical ways of assessing and applying resilience.

The topic is still really in the research phase, and suffers from a lack of clarity. The concepts in general and academic use are frequently new and ill-defined, so clarification is necessary.

Accordingly, this document sets out and attempts to clarify the concepts associated with resilience and Resilience Engineering. The concepts proposed here are based on an extensive examination of the literature. A fairly rich set of concepts with some degree of clarity and coverage has been assembled.

The application of Safety 2.0 to ship operation with its relatively low standards of safety must be seen as experimental. The extent to which processes from High Reliability Organisations can be transferred to mainstream organisations is unclear. Based on limited trials discussed below, the signs are encouraging, but the risks of good intentions being subverted are real. Soft resilience (as in Resilience Engineering) can be seen as part of Safety 2.0. This is more likely to be productive than proceeding in isolation or competition. The Resilience Engineering literature to date seems rather insular, and is still at the academic conceptual stage. It seems to make only limited use of other systems thinking resources or relevant management literature.

The move to resilience with a more responsive 'outside-in' approach to management offers potential business value to ship operators given the cyclical nature of shipping.

There are estimates of the scale of the current paperwork burden but no measures for the mismatch between the bureaucracy and effective seamanship. Resilience Engineering, in the context of Safety 2.0 offers a positive future direction for safety management. Tools and measures from Resilience Engineering have the potential to improve safety in a way that complements Safety Management Systems. Assessment measures were identified; some of these have potential for application in the shipping context, with some tailoring. The recentlydeveloped Organisational Resilience HealthCheck looks to be a promising way of measuring organisational resilience and could be of value to ship operation.

At a business level, there is a case for studying resilience in the context of greater complexity and coupling in shipping. The question of whether shipping is becoming more vulnerable to systemic accidents is an open one, but potentially important.

Resilience offers a broader focus than traditional system safety engineering. Finding ways of modelling 'hard' resilience is still at the research stage. The extent to which it offers a new theoretical basis is still unclear, but the broader focus offers the potential for a more costeffective approach in practice. Certainly, the alternative of greater system complexity and redundancy has distinct disadvantages.

There is a real shortage of measures of ‘hard’ resilience that might be used to drive design. Some approaches to modelling ‘hard’ resilience were examined with a view to future application. Three approaches to modelling were examined in detail. They indicated the potential success in practical application.

  1. A workshop exercise to examine the resilience of ship operations has been developed. The adaptation of workshop methods to shipping appears to offer a viable tool for discussion 'what-if' questions from unexpected combinations of events to develop mindfulness.
  2. The examination of bowtie modelling and use of barriers showed that this approach can be useful in the analysis of a real ship hazard situation.
  3. The FRAM modelling showed that it is possible to follow all the steps of the FRAM modelling. The FRAM model for the evolution of a fire on board ship highlights the importance of functions in describing the whole process. The application of the riskbased hypothetical scenario for the fire on board indicated that the FRAM can support estimates of, and increase resilience at a ship level in an effective and illustrative way.